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CASENOTES
Broadcasting Seven Dirty Words: FCC v. Pacifica Foundation '—On October 30,
1973, at two o'clock in the afternoon, New York educational, non-profit radio
station WBAI, owned by and licensed to the Pacifica Foundation, 2 aired a
recorded twelve-minute satiric monologue by George Carlin entitled "Filthy
Words." 3 The Carlin monologue was broadcast during the course of a regu-
larly scheduled live program. The program, whose format consists of com-
mentary by the host and listener call-ins, on this day was focusing on contem-
porary society's attitudes towards language. 4 The record was played towards
the end of the program, and was selected because "it was regarded as an
incisive satirical view of the subject under discussion."' During the course of
his monologue, Carlin repeatedly discusses the seven filthy words that "you
couldn't say on the public ... airwaves ... the ones you definitely wouldn't
say."' The record was immediately preceded by a warning to listeners that it
included sensitive and perhaps offensive language.' Those who might be of-
fended were advised to change the station and return to WBAI after fifteen
minutes'
On December 3, 1973, the Federal Communications Commission (Com-
mission) received a complaint from a listener who had heard the WBAI
broadcast of the Carlin monologue while driving with his young son. 9
 The
listener demanded to know what action the Commission intended to take in
regard to his complaint." The Commission forwarded the complaint to
' 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
2 Pacifica Foundation, a non-profit educational foundation formed in 1946,
owns five other FM radio stations across the country: KPFA and KPFB, Berkeley, Cal.;
KPFT, Houston, Texas; KPFK, Los Angeles, Cal., WPFW, Washington, D.C. Brief for
Respondent at 2 n.2, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
• In re Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975). The segment was from
the album "George Carlin, Occupation: Foole," Little David Records. The album was
recorded live at the Circle Theatre in San Carlos, California. Id.
• 438 U.S. at 730.
5 Letter from Edwin A. Goodman. President of Pacifica Foundation, to Wil-
liam B. Ray. Chief, Complaints and Compliance Division, Broadcast Bureau, FCC
(January 7, 1974), reproduced in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 3, 438 U.S. 726
(1978). Mr. Goodman wrote the letter in response to a listener's complaint which had
been forwarded to Pacifica Foundation by the Commission. See text at note 10 infra.
• 438 U.S. at 729. For a complete text of the monologue see G. Carlin, Filthy
Words, in "George Carlin, Occupation: Foole," Little David Records, transcribed in 438
U.S. at 751 (appendix). The seven dirty words are: shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits. hl.
7 Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977). It is unknown
whether the lodger of the complaint heard this warning.
• Id.
9 438 U.S. at 730. This was the only complaint lodged with either the Com-
mission or WBAI about the airing of the monologue. Brief for Amici Curiae American
Civil Liberties Union, et al. at 6. Brief for Amici Curiae American Broadcasting Co.,
Inc., et al. at 7. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
'° Letter from John H. Douglas to the Commission (November 28, 1973), re-
printed in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 2. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Mr. Douglas
wrote:
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Pacifica Foundation (Pacifica) for comment." Pacifica responded by claiming
that Carlin was "a significant social satirist of American manners and language
in the tradition of Mark Twain and Mort Sahl," and that airing the
monologue in the context of the program was "natural and contributed to a
further understanding on the subject." 12 Pacifica was not requested to and
did not choose to address the issue of the monologue's offensiveness or the
appropriateness of the time of day of the broadcast.'"
After receiving Pacifica's response, the Commission issued a Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order (Order)" pursuant to its statutory authority under
18 U.S.C. section 1464' 5
 and 47 U.S.C. section 303.'" The Order defined
the indecent language prohibited by section 1464 as that language which de-
scribes "in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs,
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience.' The Commission found that. the language used in the
monologue was broadcast. in a manner patently offensive by contemporary
community standards and at a time when children were undoubtedly in the
audience." Applying the foregoing standard, the Commission concluded
that the broadcast was indecent and thus prohibited by section 1464." As a
further justification for its actions, the Commission cited its statutory obliga-
tion under section 303(g) to promote the larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest. 2 " The Order imposed no formal sanctions
against Pacifica; 21 but the Commission put the Order into Pacifica's file and
Whereas I can perhaps understand 'X-rated' phonograph record's being
sold for private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast of the
same over the air .... Any child could have been turning the dial, and
tuned into the garbage .... I'd like to know, gentleman, just what you're
going to do about this outrage, and, by copy, I'm asking our elected offi-
cials the same thing,
Id. at 2-3 app.
" 438 U.S. at 730.
12 In re Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 96 (1975) (quoting letter from
Pacifica Foundation to Commission, January 7, 1974).
13
 Brief fOr Respondent a! 3-4 n.3, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
' 4 In re Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
15
 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent,
or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not inure than two years, or both.'
47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from
time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall-
....
(g)	 generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio
in the public interest; ....
17 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
111 Id. at 99.
Id,
20 N.
21 Id. For violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Congress has empowered the Com-
mission to revoke a station's license or construction permit, 47 U.S.C. 312(a)(6)
(1976); issue a cease and desist order, 47 U.S.C. § 3I2(b)(2) (1976); or impose a
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threatened that it would use its administrative sanctions if it received further
complaints. 22
Pacifica appealed the Commission's finding that the broadcast was hide-
cent and prohibited by section 1464. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed with the position espoused by Pacifica,
and reversed the Commission's Order.'" There was, however, no consensus
among the three judges on the panel. Consequently, there were three sepa-
rate opinions written, with one judge dissenting."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 25 and in a plurality decision, re-
versed the decision of the court of appeals.' The Court found that the
monologue was indecent as broadcast,27 and concluded that in view of the
unique characteristics of broadcasting, the Commission was within both its
statutory authority and the constitutional limits in prohibiting the broadcast. 28
The Supreme Court limited the scope of its review to the Commission's
determination that the monologue was indecent "as broadcast." 2 " Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the plurality, noted that the Order was issued in and limited
to a specific factual setting. The Court therefore expressly reserved questions
concerning the Commission's handling of similar situations in the future."
The Court underscored the narrowness of its holding by pointing out that the
indecency"' standard was not necessarily applicable to broadcast mediums
other than radio, to the broadcast of renowned literary works, or to the
broadcast of a similar record when the time of day and the content of the
monetary forfeiture, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(E) (1976). The Commission can also deny a
license renewal or grant a short-term renewal if such action is consistent with the pub-
lic interest. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976).
22 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
" Pacifica Foundation v, FCC, 556 F.2c1 9, 10, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
'" Judge Tannin found the Order invalid on either of two grounds; first, on
the ground that it constituted censorship in direct violation of 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976),
and, alternatively, on the ground that. the Order was overbroad and vague. hi. at 18.
Chief Justice Bazelon concurred on the basis that the Commission's indecency standard
went beyond the limits of the Supreme Court's guidelines for obscenity, and that no
other exception under the first amendment was justified for offensive speech in the
broadcast context. Id. at 24-29 (Bazelon. C.J., concurring). Judge Leventhal dissented,
and would have upheld the Commission's regulation of the monologue as broadcasted.
Id. at 36-37 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
2' 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
2" 438 U.S. at 751. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the majority of
the Court for parts 1, [I, 1[1, and 1V-C. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist joined in part 1V-C of the majority opinion. Id. at 729. 755. For
parts IV-A and 1V-B, Justice Stevens wrote a plurality opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and justice Rehnquist joined, id. at 729. and Justices Blackmun and Powell
concurred. ht. at 755, 756. Justice Brennan tiled a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Marshall joined. Id. at 762. Justice Stewart also dissented and was joined in his opinion
by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. ht. at 777.
17 Id. at 741.
28 Id. at 748-51.
2" Id. at 734-35.
"" ht. at 743.
3i As it is used in this article, the term "indecency" refers only to speech and
not to conduct. It is used synonymously with the term "indecent speech."
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program would indicate that the number of children in the audience would
be at a minimum." Moreover, in limiting its review to the proscription of
this particular broadcast, the Court declined to consider the hypothetical ef-
fects of the indecency standard, 33
 and thus avoided what it saw as an "un-
necessary" adjudication of constitutional issues." The Court, therefore, was
able to dismiss Pacifica's argument that even if the prohibition against this
particular broadcast. was constitutionally valid, the Commission's construction
of section 1464 encompassed so much constitutionally protected speech as to
be unconstitutional."
The Court addressed two relevant statutory issues presented by the
case. 36
 The first issue was the relationship between section 1464 of the Crim-
inal Code, which prohibits the broadcast of indecent, obscene, or profane lan-
guage," and section 326 of the Communications Act which prohibits the
Commission from interfering with the broadcaster's right of free speech."
The second statutory issue was whether the broadcasted monologue was inde-
cent under section 1464 despite the absence of the element of prurient appeal
necessary to constitute obscenity."
In addressing the first of these two statutory issues, the Court examined
judicial precedent and legislative history, and determined that the anti-censor-
ship provision of section 326 was not a limitation on the Commission's author-
ity to regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language under
section 1464. 4 " Examining the judicial precedent, the Court noted that since
the enactment of the anti-censorship provision in 1927, the Federal Radio
Commission, its successor, the Federal Communications Commission, and the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the appellate-forum for broad-
cast-related litigation, all have consistently interpreted section 326 as a pro-
hibition against only prior restraint of proposed broadcasts.'" Section 326
has not been seen as a denial of the Commission's power to take into account
the content. of the broadcast after it has been completed." The Court im-
32
 438 U.S. at 748-49 & n.29.
33 Id. at 743.
34 Id. at 734.
38 Id. at 742-43. -
36
 Id. at 735. The Court declined consideration of the Commission's reliance
on 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976) as an additional justification for its Order. Id. at 739
n.13. See text at note 20 supra.
" The text of section 1464 is set out in note 15 supra.
38
 438 U.S. at 735-38. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with
the right of free speech by means of radio communications.
" 438 U.S. at 738-41.
40 Id. at 738.
41
 Id. at 735-37.
42 Id. at 735-37 & n.11 (citing Idaho Microwave, Association of Theatre Owners
v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970); Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
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plicitly adopted this analysis and characterized the Order as involving only
post-broadcast review, and hence not limited by the anti-censorship provi-
sion.`43
Turning to the legislative history, the Court pointed out that the anti-cen-
sorship provision and the prohibition against indecent or obscene language
together comprised section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927." The Court stated
that the enacting Congress could not have intended the anti-censorship provi-
sion of section 29 to act as a limitation on the broadcast provision.° Other-
wise, the dual provisions would have had a nullifying effect on each other.
Even though these provisions of former section 29 are now located in differ-
ent sections of the Code," the Court found nothing in the legislative history
to indicate that this rearrangement was intended to change the scope or
meaning of section 326. 47 Rather, the Court noted that the separation was
merely a by-product of a major revision of the Criminal Code in 1948." Ac-
denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969): United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2c1944 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Bay State Beacon, Inc. v. FCC, 171 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1948)). It is important to note,
however, that the Court's reliance on these cited cases may be misplaced. The cases
involved applications for license renewal, not direct enforcement of section 1464. The
imposition of civil sanctions for violations of section 1464 of the Criminal Code, 47
U.S.C. 1464 (1976), is more chilling of speech and threatening to licensees than an
overall review of a station's performance at renewal time, and thus might be a violation
of section 326. Consequently. the precedential value of the cases relied upon by the
Court is questionable.
43 438 U.S. at 737-38.
44 Id. at 738. Section 29 of the Radio Act. of 1927 provided:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing
authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or sig-
nals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall
be promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communications. No per-
son within the jurisdiction of the United States shall titter any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication.
Id. at 735 (quoting Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, ch. 169, § 29, 44 Stat. 1172-73
(1927)).
43 438 U.S. at 738.
46 Id. The two provisions were re-enacted in the same section in the Com-
munications Act of 1934. Id. In 1948, the prohibition against obscene, indecent, or
profane language was transferred from the Communications Act and re-enacted in its
present form as section 1464 of Title 18. The transfer of section 1464 was effected as
part of a major revision of the Criminal Code. The anti-censorship provision, on the
other hand, is still contained in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1976).
47 438 U.S. at 738. Both the Senate anti the House Reports on the 1947 pro-
posed revision of the Criminal Code stated that great care had been exercised to pre-
serve the meaning of the existing law as then expressed. See S. REP. No. 1559. 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-8 (1947). See
also Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162 & n.29 (1972). The Tidewa-
ter Court reaffirmed "a well-established principle governing the interpretation of pro-
visions altered in the 1948 revision ... that 'no change is to be presumed unless clearly
expressed.' "Id. at 162 (quoting Fournco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353
U.S. 222, 228 (1957)).
48 438 U.S. at 738.
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cordingly, the Court found that section 326 was not applicable to section
1464, and thus did not limit the Commission's authority under that statute to
regulate the broadcast of indecent, obscene, or profane language.
The second statutory issue addressed by the Court was whether the
broadcast was indecent under section 1464 in the admitted absence of the
prurient appeal element needed to constitute obscenity." Pacifica argued
that the Court's decision in Handing a. United States" militated against finding
that a broadcast was indecent absent a finding of prurient appea1. 51
 In Ham-
ling, the Court held that 18 U.S.C. section 1461, 5 ' which prohibits the mailing
of obscene or indecent material, only prohibited the mailing of material which
had prurient appeal." The Pacifica Court, however, did not feel compelled
by its previous opinion in Handing to find that prurient appeal was a neces-
sary definitional element of indecent language under section 1464.' 4 In re-
jecting Pacifica's argument, the Court. reasoned that, although sections 1461
and 1464 are both criminal statutes regulating the dissemination of offensive
material, the different, nature of the two modes of communication being
regulated—discrete mailing to individuals versus public broadcasting—
justified differing interpretations of seemingly similar statutes." The Court.
found that tinder section 1464 indecency is merely "nonconformance with ac-
cepted standards of morality" and that it is not subsumed under the notion of
obscenity.'" Because the Court found that Pacifica had not questioned the
finding that the broadcast was offensive, the Court reasoned that Pacifica's
challenge of the finding that the broadcast was indecent was based solely
upon the absence of prurient appeal." 7 Therefore, having resolved that pru-
rient appeal was not a necessary element of indecency,"' the Court concluded
"1 " hi. at 738
- 39.
5"
 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
5 ' 438 U.S. at 740 -41.
" 18 U.S.C:. § 1461 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Every obscene, lewd,
lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance: „
Is delayed to be nomnailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or
delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier."
5 :3 418 U.S. at 112-13.
54 438 U.S. at 741. Although the Court had not expressly ruled on the mean-
ings of the terms used in section 1464 prior to this case, Pacifica's contention that
"indecent" is subsumed under the definition of "obscenity," and therefore requires an
element of prurient appeal, finds support in precedent interpreting related statutes.
See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 112-13 (1974) (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461): United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8N1N1. Film. 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7
(1973) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1462, dealing with the importation or transportation of
offensive material). justice Stewart, in his dissent, relied on ibis judicial precedent
when he advocated construing "indecent," as used in section 1464, to be synonymous
with "obscene." 438 U.S. at 777-80.
55
 438 U.S. at 741.
56 Id. at 739-40.
.'7 Id. at 739.
' See text at notes 49-56 supra.
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that Pacifica had no further statutory objections to the Commission's finding
that the broadcast was indecent..`'"
Having disposed of the statutory issues, the Court addressed the question
whether the first amendment circumscribes the Commission's power to pro-
hibit the broadcast of indecent. language in any circumstances." The Court
found that although the language was offensive and of "slight social value," it
was still protected speech."' The Court. observed, however, that the Constitu-
tion does not require this protection to be absolute; it may vary according to
the context in which the language is used."' The Court noted that in the
broadcasting context, otherwise protected speech constitutionally could be re-
stricted." The Court remarked that the special attributes of broadcasting
historically have entitled the medium to only limited first amendment protec-
tion." The Court has used two rationales to justify the regulation of broad-
casting: the intrusive and pervasive nature of the broadcast medium, and the
unavoidable presence of young children in the audience." In Pacifica, the
Court applied both of these rationales and decided that the Commission's ac-
tion was constitutionally valid.""
The significance of the decision in Pacifica is two-fold. First, the case rep-
resents the first time that the Supreme Court has reviewed the Commission's
independent authority to enforce section 1464 of the Criminal Code which
prohibits the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language. By uphold-
ing the Order, the Court granted its tacit approval of the Commission's juris-
`" 438 U.S. at 741. There are two major flaws in the Court's line of analysis on
this point. First, Pacifica never addressed the offensiveness of the broadcast in its re-
sponse to the Commission's inquiry because it was only requested "to submit com-
ments" regarding the listener's complaint. "Accordingly, the fact that Pacifica's re-
sponse 'did not deny' certain of the facts underlying the Commission's subsequent.
Order cannot he construed as a tacit admission of such facts." Brief for Respondent at
4 n.3, Pacifica. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Second, the Court's argument is flawed because it
relied on an inappropriate standard for determining the offensiveness of the broad-
cast. Even assuming that. Pacifica had admitted that the broadcast was offensive, such
an admission should not have been dispositive. Rather, the Court should have applied
the contemporary community standard, as articulated by the Commission, in determin-
ing the offensiveness of the broadcast. In general, application of the contemporary
community standard could yield results inconsistent with those that might he obtained
by applying the vendor's own standards of offensiveness. For example, language which
might be considered offensive by the vendor, could conceivably pass muster under the
contemporary community standard.
438 U.S. at 744.
"' Id. at 746.
" 2 ht. at 747.
"3
 Id. at 748-51.
'' Id. The Colin discussed the fact that. unlike any other medium, broadcast-
ers may be denied a license if the Commission decides that such action would best
serve the public interest. Id. at 748. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a), 312(a)(2) (1976). Second,
the Court noted that, under the Fairness D ctrine, brtmcicasters, unlike newspaper
publishers, arc obliged to give free time for the expression of opposing viewpoints.
438 U.S. at 748. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), ?Mit
Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
" 438 U.S. at 748-49.
"" Id. at 748-51.
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diction. Therefore, this decision effectively broadened the authority of the
Commission to control programming beyond its previous limits of licensing
discretion and of issuing guidelines for maximizing community service.`'' The
Commission now has the power, concurrent with and independent from the
justice Department, to enforce section 1464. Second, this case is significant
because the Court found that the prohibition against indecent broadcasting in
18 U.S.C. section 1464 provides for the regulation of non-obscene," constitu-
tionally protected speech." By carving out a new class of speech which is
susceptible to government regulation, Pacifica authorizes a further limitation
of' first amendment freedoms.
This note will examine the Court's jurisdictional and substantive interpre-
tations of 18 U.S.C. section 1464. It will first demonstrate the importance of
this enlargement of the Commission's authority by placing the decision in its
historical context. The article next will analyze the substantive standard for
indecency by evaluating the rationales used by the Court to justify the regula-
tion of protected speech. It will be submitted that the justifications used by
the Court for regulating indecent speech in the broadcast arena are insuffi-
cient under existing standards of review. The analysis of the standard for
indecency will continue by comparing the standard accepted by the Pacifica
Court with the standard used for unprotected obscene speech. It will be dem-
onstrated that the indecency standard is less tolerant than the obscenity stan-
dard, and that this discrepancy is unjustifiable in light of the similarities be-
tween the two areas being regulated. It will be proposed therefore that the
Court should have imposed the same limitations on the indecency standard as
were placed on the obscenity standard. Finally, the article will examine the
impact of the decision on the Commission's policies and on broadcasters'
freedom of speech.
I. THE COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE SECTION 1464
Although 18 U.S.C. section 1464 appears to be a substantial control on
programming content, it has rarely been invoked by the Commission or the
Justice Department both because obscene and indecent broadcasts are a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, 7 " and because of the Commission's uncertainty
about its role in the statutory scheme. 7 ' This uncertainty was conceivably
87 This increase in administrative authority to regulate radio broadcasting
stands in strong contrast with the trend towards deregulation in the areas of time
devoted to advertising, news, and community services. See FCC moves to Relax Radio-
Station Rules in Some Large Cities To Test Deregulation, Wall St. J., October 20, 1978, at 3.
"" 438 U.S. at 741.
89 Id. at 746.
7" See In re Sonderling Broadcast Corp.. 41 F.C.C.2d 777. 778 n.5 (1973) (chart-
ing the rise in the number of listener complaints about allegedly obscene, indecent, or
profane programming from fiscal 1971-73); In re Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94,
94 (1975). See also Comment, Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Federal Communications
Commission and Section 1464 Violations, 1974 ARIZ. ST. [...J. 457, 457 & n.l.
7 ' Proposed Amendment to the Communications Act of 1934: Hearings on S. 2004
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Commerce Comm— 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. 2 343-74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
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attributable to the legislative history of section 1464. Originally, as the Pacifica
Court pointed out, section 1464 was enacted as a provision of section 29 of
the Radio Act of 1927, the predecessor of the current Communications
Act." In 1948, Congress, as part of its major revision of the Criminal Code,
removed the provision from the Radio Act and incorporated section 1464 into
chapter 71 of Title 18 along with other federal criminal statutes regulating
offensive material." Consequently, the Commission arguably was left unsure
whether the removal of section 1464 from the Communications Act was to be
read as a reflection of congressional intent to strip the agency of its ad-
judicatory powers or whether the Commission was to have continued jurisdic-
tion.
The Commission's confusion over the meaning of the statutory
rearrangement was perhaps compounded by the fact that Congress made am-
biguous cross-references in the Communications Act to section 1464 of the
Criminal Code. These cross-references in the Communications Act empower
the Commission to impose a variety of civil sanctions for "violations" of
section 1464. 74 The use of the term "violation" makes it unclear whether a
criminal conviction is a condition precedent to the imposition of these civil
sanctions, or whether the Commission has the jurisdiction to determine inde-
pendently if a violation has occurred." Prior to 1970, the Commission chose
to maintain a conservative policy of conditioning the imposition of the civil
sanctions upon either a successful prosecution by the justice Department, or
upon a determination by the justice Department that the offense was pros-
ecutable!" The Commission thereby limited itself" to forwarding complaints
to the Justice Department which in turn rarely acted upon them. 77
72 438 U.S. at 735.
73 Sec note 46 supra. The other sections in chapter 71 of Title 18 involve
mailing offensive or crime-inciting matter, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976), importation or
transportation of obscene matters, 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1976), mailing offensive matter
on wrappers or envelopes, 18 U.S.C. § 1463 (1976), and the transportation of offen-
sive material for sale or distribution, 18 U.S.C. 1465 (1976).
74
 For a discussion of the available sanctions, see note 21 supra.
75
 See Comment, Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Federal Communications
Commission and Section 1464 Violations, 1974 ARiz. ST. L.J. 457, 466.
7"
 1969 Hearings, supra note 71, at 347, 357, 359, 360, 373. Commissioner Cox
told the Senate subcommittee:
If [the incidents] are not prosecutable, they are not obscenity. They there-
fore do not violate [section 1464], do not violate our rules, and cannot be
the basis for adverse action.
The Senator is reading a criminal statute for which a man can be prose-
cuted, put in jail for two years, and fined $10,000. If he does something
which is criminal, then it is obscene. If it is not obscene enough to be
criminal, then it is not obscene.
Id. at 357, 360.
" Id. at 347-48. We present these cases to the Department of Justice who
invariably fail to prosecute. They will feel under the Supreme Court standards they
could not sustain a conviction." Id. at 347.
The Justice Department has prosecuted broadcasters for indecent or obscene lan-
guage only live times: United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1977); United
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Despite the fact that the Commission relied on the Justice Department to
formally enforce section 1464, the Commission's policy did not render it. com-
pletely helpless in controlling obscene and indecent broadcasting. To the con-
trary, the infrequency of this type of broadcasting probably was attributable to
the fact that. the commercial value of the broadcast. licenses, coupled with the
Commission's broad discretionary power to renew them every three years,'"
gives the Commission effective leverage for keeping the policies and opera-
tions of current licensees in check without resorting to formal or direct sanc-
tions. The Commission has exercised this leverage through informal methods
of influencing program control, such as issuing guidelines, which have had a
marked effect on broadcasters' programming decisions.'" Furthermore, the
Commission takes into consideration prior incidents of offensive broadcasting
when evaluating the public interest For license grants and renewals." In this
States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972): Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2cI 282
(7th Cir. 1972); Gagliardi v. United Stales, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966); Duncan v.
United Stales, 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931). The Duncan
case was brought under the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, ch. 169, § 29, 44 Stat.
1172-73 (1927). Duncan, 48 F.2d at 129. The other four cases were brought under 18
U.S.C. § 1464.
More often than not, however, the Justice Department has returned complaints
forwarded to them by the Commission with a letter indicating that they did not believe
the offenses to be prosecutable. The following is an excerpt from one such letter.
We have received the exhibits attached to your letter and agree that the
facts do not warrant consideration of a criminal prosecution. Not only is
the reacting of the poem an inappropriate subject for an obscenity prosecu-
tion, hut, it is evident that the station took steps to insure that the listening
audience would contain few, if any, minors or other persons who would be
offended by listening to its reading.
Letter from the Justice Department to the Commission, quoted in 1969 Hearings, supra
note 71. at 348.
T 8
 47 U.S.C.	 307(a), (d) (1976).
7 " A good example of this informal control was evident in the reaction of' the
broadcasters to Commission Chairman Dean Burch's annual address before the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters on March 28, 1973. Address by Dean Burch,
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, before the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters, in Washington. D.C., March 28, 1973 (released as F.C.C. Puhlic
Notice No. 99446, cited in Comment, Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Federal Com-
munications Commission and Section 1464 Violations, 1974 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 457, 464 n.50). In
his address, Chairman Burch vehemently condemned the sex-talk show—"topless
radio- -format and threatened to use strong administrative action to curtail such
programs. 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. at 464. This address proved to he sufficient warning to
licensees and provided ample impetus for the "cleaning-up-
 of these sex-talk shows.
N.Y. Times, April 24. 1973, 1, at 1, col. 1., (cited in Comment, Broadcasting Obscene
Language: The Federal Communications Commission and Section 1464 Violations, 1974 Atoz.
ST. L.J. 457, 464).
See FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284, 290 n.7 (1954),
wherein the Court stated:
The 'public interest, convenience, or necessity' standard for the issuance of
licenses would seem to imply a requirement that the applicant he law-
abiding. In any event, the standard is sufficiently broad to permit the
Commission to consider the applicant's past or proposed violation of a Fed-
eral criminal statute especially designed to bar certain conduct by operators
of radio and television stations.
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way, any licensee found not to be in compliance with the Commission's stan-
dards can have its request denied. All listener complaints, including those con-
cerning allegedly obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasts, and the licensee's
response thereto, are associated with the broadcaster's file." This complete
file is then employed by the Commission in determining whether, based on its
past performance, a renewal of the broadcaster's license or a grant of another
station to the broadcaster would be in the public interest. 82 Thus, by
capitalizing on its licensing powers. the Commission has been able to exert
infuence on the programming decisions of licensees.
These indirect methods, however, were apparently insufficient to control
the rising level of broadcast obscenity and indecency. In 1969, the Commis-
sion's established pattern of deferring all formal enforcement of section 1464
to the Justice Department came under heavy attack by the Senate Sub-
Committee on Communications." The Sub-Committee expressed its strong
dissatisfaction with the agency's policy and suggested that it begin to act on its
own initiative to curb the trend towards offensive broadcasting." In re-
Id.; accord, National Broadcasting Co., Inc, v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943)
("Nothing in the provisions or history of the Commications Act lends support to the
inference that the Commission was denied the power to refuse a license to a station
not operating in the 'public interest,' merely because its misconduct happened to be an
unconvicted violation of the anti-trust laws.").
" In re Application of Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 148 (1964).
" See, e.g., In re Application of Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250,
255-58 (1962), alp sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964) (refusal to renew a license, in part attributable to "coarse,
vulgar and suggestive" broadcasts during its previous license period). Palmetto was af-
t -II -rued solely on the ground that the licensee was guilty of misrepresentation before
the Commission in stating that he lacked knowledge of the broadcast material which
was the source of the listener complaints about offensive broadcasts. The court stated:
"[w]e intimate no views on whether the Commission could have denied the applications
if Robinson had been truthful." 334 F.2d at 536. Thus, the court of appeals did not
decide whether the prior offensive broadcasts, standing alone, would have justified the
denial of the renewal application. •
See also In re Application of Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2c1 833,
833-34 (1970) (short-term, one-year renewal clue to the broadcast of profane, indecent,
or obscene language during its past license period); In re Applications of WRFC
Broadcasting Service and WMPS, Inc., 19 F.C.C. 1082, 1113-14 (1955) (prior radio
broadcast of six offensive songs a factor in television license denial).
But see In re Application of the Meredith Corp., 37 F.C.C.2d 551, 556 (1972) (de-
spite allegations of offensive broadcastings, the Commission granted a license renewal,
noting that "[a]lthough certain programs may be offensive to listeners or viewers, those
offended do not have the right, through the Commission's licensing power to remove
such programming from the air."); In re Petition by Oliver R. Grace, 22 F.C.C.2d 667,
668 (1970) (in response to a listener complaint about offensive programming, the
Commission commented that "there can be no governmental arbiter of taste in the
broadcast field."); In re Application of Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 148-52
(1964) (the Commission granted licenses, despite listener complaints, because the
Commission could not find that the "substantial pattern of operation [was) inconsistent.
with the public interest standard ....").
" 1969 Hearings, supra note 71, at 343-74.
84 Id. at 359, 362, 363, 373. The following excerpts are typical of the type of
pressure placed on the Commission by the Senators:
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sponse to such criticism, the Commission imposed its first civil sanctions on
licensees for violations of section 1464. 85
The Commission first flexed its administrative muscles in Eastern Educa-
tion Radio" only four months after the Senate Sub-Committee hearings. In
Eastern, the Commission determined that the licensee had violated section
1464 by broadcasting an interview with rock musician Jerry Garcia in which
Garcia gratuitously,
 used language which the Commission found to be inde-
cent." Consequently, the Commission issued to Eastern a Notice of Appar-
ent Liability and imposed a penalty of $100 pursuant to 47 U.S.C. sections
503(b)(I)(A), (13), (E), and (b)(2)." In the winter of 1973, the Commission
initiated formal proceedings against another licensee—Sonderling Broadcast
Corporation—fOr violations of section 1464. 8" In Sanderling, the Commission
found that the licensee's mid-day sex-talk radio show was obscene and inde-
cent under the standards of section 1464."" The Commission therefore is-
SENATOR GURNEY: I don't see how it will do any good to buckpass with
the Justice Department, and this is what you have been doing there. I
should think you would take sonic initiative on your own ....
SENATOR PASTORE: Today you are expressing an attitude of helpless-
ness with regard to this permissiveness, and obscenity. You are saying you
are almost powerless.... We are losing sight here of commonsense. To
me, it is a question of guts.
Id. at 359; 362-63,
85 See In re WUHY-FM, Eastern Education Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). In
initiating its action against Eastern, the Commission said: "In sum, we hold that we
have the authority to act here under Section 1464 ...." Id. at 414. See also In re Pacifica
Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975); In re Sonderling Broadcast Corp., 27 R.R.2d 285,
reconsideration denied, 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973). aff'd sub /WM. Illinois Citizens Committee
for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 12 ,2c1 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Eastern, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412-14.
Hi Id. The fifty-minute interview was broadcast on January 4, 1970 on non-
commercial, educational radio station WUHY-FM in Philadelphia, Pa. Id. at 408-09.
The show, entitled "Cycle II," was broadcast weekly, from 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Id.
at 408. During this particular interview, Garcia presented his views on ecology, music,
philosophy arid interpersonal relationships, and he made frequent use of the words
"fuck" and "shit" as adjectives or as miscellaneous expletives. Id. at 409. For example,
he said: "Political change is so fucking slow." Id.
88 Id. at 408, 415. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any licensee or permittee of a broadcast station who—
(E) violates section ... 1464 of Title 18,
shall forfeit to the United States a sum not to exceed $1000. Each day
during which such violation occurs shall constitute a separate offense....
(2) No forfeiture liability under paragraph (I) of this subsection (b)
shall attach unless a written notice of apparent liability shall have been
issued by the Commission and such notice has been received by the li-
censee Or permittee
89 In re Sonderling Broadcast Corp., 27 R.R.2d 285 (1973), rehearing denied, 41
F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd sub 710M . Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
9°
 Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 403 - 04
& n.I4 (1975). Sonderling broadcasted a listener call-in, sex-talk show entitled "Femme
Forum" from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on WGLD-FM, Oak Park, Illinois. Id. at 401.
The Commission focused on two programs: one, on February 21, 1973, discussed the
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sued a Notice of Apparent Liability and imposed a penalty of $2000 on Son-
derling. The Commission again exercised its enforcement powers in its
Pacifica decision, released in February of 1975." Pacifica differs from its two
predecessors in that no formal sanctions were imposed upon the licensee "2
and that it was a unanimous decision by the Commissioners." 3
Of the three licensees found by the Commission to have violated section
1464, only Pacifica chose to appeal the agency's findings)" The resulting
decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, therefore, represents the first time that.
the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the Commission's underly-
ing determination that it was vested with the necessary statutory authority to
adjudicate pursuant to section 1464 without prior justice Department ac-
tion." Although the Court did not explicitly address the issue of the Com-
mission's assumption of independent jurisdiction, its tacit endorsement was
topic, "how do you keep your sex life alive?"; the other, on February 23, 1973, dis-
cussed oral sex techniques. Id.
Interestingly, Sonderling had banned all sex-related topics from the "Femme
Forum" in response to Chairman Burch's address. See note 79 supra. The ban was
issued two weeks prior to the date on which the station received its Notice of Apparent
Liability from the Commission. See Comment, Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Fed-
eral Communications Commission and Section 1464 Violations, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 457,
465.
"' In re Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). See also text and notes at
notes 14-22 supra.
92 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
13 Id. at 94. It is interesting to note that Pacifica Foundation had been the
source of controversy for the Commission for many years. See, e.g., In re Application
of Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964). In 1969, the Commission received more
complaints directed at Pacifica than at any other licensee; up until that year, however,
Pacifica was also the largest educational radio station owner in the country. 1969 Hear-
ings, supra note 71, at 350, 361, 365. It was the granting of an additional license to
Pacifica Foundation, despite the numerous complaints about its programming, that
prompted the Senate subcommittee to investigate the Commission's inability to check
the rise in offensive broadcasting. Id. at 343.
94
 Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Commission's
ruling in Sonderling was appealed by a group of citizens, however, and affirmed sub
nom. in Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.
1974). The Illinois Citizens court confined its review to the Commission's finding that
the broadcast was obscene, and thus reserved the question of the constitutionality of
the Commission's interpretation of the term "indecent." Id. at 404 n.14.
95 During the 1969 Hearings, supra note 71, Commissioner Rex Lee made it
apparent that the Commission was desirous of a definitive judicial statement as to their
authority under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 ("I think if we move toward issuing some orders
which impose fines we soon will have a court case on the thing and a final answer." Id.
at 374.). See also id. at 346. Similarly, in Eastern, the Commission invited the licensee to
seek judicial review of its actions:
We believe that a most crucial peg underlying all Commission action in the
programming field is the vital consideration that the courts are there to
review and reserve any action which runs afoul of the First Amendment.
Thus, while we think that our action is fully consistent with the law, there
should clearly be the avenue of court review in a case of this nature ....
Indeed we would welcome such review, since only in that way can the per-
tinent standards be definitively determined.
24 F.C.C.2d at 415.
988	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:975
evidenced in two ways: (1) by the Court's approval of the Commission's Or-
der; "" and (2) by the Court's finding that the validity of a civil sanction was
independent from the validity of a criminal penalty for the same offense."'
This finding of independent validity implies that prior Justice Department
action is not a condition precedent to the assumption of Commission jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the offense need not he prosecutable before the Commission can
declare a broadcast indecent and impose the appropriate civil sanction.
Moreover, the Court expressly left open whether Pacifica's broadcast would
have necessarily justified a criminal prosecution," thereby implying that the
Commission's construction of section 1464 is not binding on the Justice De-
partment." Under the Pacifica. Court's statutory construction, therefore, the
Commission and the Justice Department have concurrent yet independent au-
thority to enforce section 1464.
In establishing this criminal-civil distinction, the Court looked to the legis-
lative history and noted that although the Communications Act incorporates
the criminal statute by reference, the history of the provisions establishes their
independence.'" The Court pointed out that in the Radio Act of 1927 and
in the Communications Act of 1934 the statutory prohibition against indecent.
speech was distinct from the provision imposing the civil penalties and from
the provision imposing the criminal penalties for transgressions of the prohi-
bition."' The Court noted that, under the terms of the Act, a finding that a
provision was invalid would not affect the validity of the other provisions in
the Act. 102 The Court found that the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code was
intended to change only the placement of the provisions and not this inde-
pendent relationship between them.'" The Court, therefore, concluded that
the enforceability of section 1464 as a criminal statute was intended to remain
96 438 U.S. at 741.
97 Id. at 739 n.13.
" 8
 Id. at 750.
"1" Interestingly, the Justice Department felt that the construction given to sec-
tion 1464 by the Court for the imposition of civil penalties would be binding in crimi-
nal prosecutions. Brief for the United States at 9, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The
Department. cited FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.. 347 U.S. 284 (1954), to sup-
port this position. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the interpretive regulations
that the Commission had promulgated with respect to an anti-lottery criminal statute,
18 U.S.C. 1304 (1976). American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. at 296. In so doing, the
Court recognized that the Commission and the Justice Department had concurrent
statutory enfOrcement duties pursuant to section 1304. 347 U.S. at 289. The Court
found that the Commission's regulations were invalid, reasoning that although it was
not a criminal prosecution, this litigation was pursuant to a criminal statute which must
he strictly construed. 347 U.S. at 296. "There cannot be one construction for the Fed-
eral Communications Commission and another for the Department of Justice. If' we
should give § 1304 the broad construction urged by the Commission, the same con-
struction would likewise apply in criminal cases." 347 U.S. at 296.
"" 438 U.S. 739 n. 13.
101 Id.
102 Id .
103 Id. See note 47 supra.
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distinct from the applicability of the civil provisions in the Communications
Act. 1 04
In addition to the legislative history rationale, the Pacifica Court's reluc-
tance to bind the outcome of a criminal prosecution to the result in this civil
case was apparently based on the differing degree of harshness between the
criminal and civil penalties for violations of section 1464."' This reasoning
was made apparent in the Court's attempt to reconcile the present decision
with the holding in Cohen v. California 106 wherein the defendant was acquitted
under a different statute but for a seemingly similar offense."' The Court
thereby hinted that the severity of the potentially applicable criminal sanctions
in the Pacifica case may have accounted for its reluctance to extend the hold-
ing in Pacifica to criminal prosecutions.'" It can be implied. therefore, that
the Court would review the imposition of a criminal penalty more strictly than
the levying of civil sanctions for the same or similar offenses. For example, if
Pacifica subsequently were criminally prosecuted by the justice Department
under the same statute for the same offense, the Court has retained the right
to be more scrutinizing in this later review than it was with the standard used
by the Commission in Pacifica.. In summary, the Commission may impose civil
sanctions for offenses that might not. warrant a criminal penalty.
Although it appears that criminal prosecutions under section 1464 will be
reviewed more strictly than will civil actions, the Court did not explain pre-
cisely how it envisioned the criminal and civil standards to differ. One poten-
tial difference might. he reflected in the fact. that the Court set forth in the
civil standard no requirement. of an intent to violate section 1464, whereas in
the criminal prosecutions under the statute, the courts have consistently con-
strued the statute as requiring a wrongful mental state.'" The courts have
1 " This historical argument is unconvincing since it only establishes that a find-
ing of the invalidity of one of the provisions will not affect the validity of the other.
The Court's reasoning fails to explain, as it purports to, why the standard for the
application of the civil and criminal penalties for violations of the same prohibition
should differ.
'° 438 U.S. at 747 n.25.
"" 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
" 7 438 U.S. at 747 n.25. In Cohen, the Court reversed the appellant's conviction
for disturbing the peace, and overturned his sentence of 30 days in prison. 403 U.S. at
26. Cohen was arrested for entering a Los Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket bear-
ing the words "Fuck the Draft." 403 U.S. at 16. The Court in Pacifica pointed out that:
"It should be noted that the Commission imposed a far more moderate penalty on
Pacifica than the state court imposed on Cohen." 438 U.S. at 797 n.25.
" The criminal penalties provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) for the
broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language are not more than $10,000 in
fines, or not more than two years in jail, or both. In contrast, the civil penalties pro-
vided for a section 1464 violation consist of revoking a license, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6)
(1976), or issuing a cease and desist order, 47 U.S.C. § 312(b)(2) (1976), or imposing a
fine of $1000 per offense but not exceeding $10,000, 47 U.S.C. 503(b)(1)(E), (b)(3)
(1976).
"" United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126, 1128-30 (7th Cir. 1972): Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d
282, 285 (7th Cir. 1972); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 724 (9th Cir.
1966). The Tallman Court noted: "Thus the common law mental element required for
conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1464, here more appropriately termed intent than sci-
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stated that the defendant's intent in those criminal cases was a "very pertinent
and necessary element." "° It appears that the Commission in Pacifica antici-
pated the imposition of this intent requirement. The Commission's Order
stressed that the broadcast was deliberate and that the monologue was pre-
recorded.'" The Court nevertheless omitted these facts from its opinion
and, therefore, did not require for civil actions that the broadcaster have in-
tended to violate the law. II2
Whatever form the different standards take, however, it remains certain
that. the Pacifica decision simultaneously gives the Commission the green light
to adjudicate and to punish by civil action violations of a penal statute, and
also provides for incongruent substantive standards to be used by the two
authorities empowered to act pursuant to section 1464. Although the signifi-
cance of these incongruencies may be minimized by the Justice Department's
continued inactivity in this area,'" it is apparent that the difference in forum
may now be outcome determinative.
II. THE INDECENCY STANDARD
In addition to approving the Com mission's exercise of its regulatory
power pursuant to section 1464, the Pacifica Court also found that the Com-
mission was not constitutionally barred from the regulation of speech which
is non-obscene " 4 and which heretofore had been fully protected by the first.
amendment.'" In other non-broadcast decisions the words used in this
program and found to be indecent by the Pacifica Court have been held to be
constitutionally protected."" The Court noted, however, that the Constitu-
enter, would be satisfied if the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that
uttering the words he did over the air was a public wrong." 465 F.2d at 288.
''° Gagliardi), 366 F.2d at 724.
"' Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 99. Similarly, in a subsequent Memorandum Opinion
and Order issued at the request of the Radio Television News Directors Association,
the Commission stated that the standard in Pacifica would not apply to the coverage of
live public events when there is no opportunity for editing. In re a Petition for Clarifi-
cation or Reconsideration of a Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation, 59
F.C.C.2d 892, 893 n.1 (1976). This is further evidence that. the Commission believed
that the broadcast had to have been deliberate in order to have constituted a violation
of section 1464.
"2
 It should be noted, however, that 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1976) requires a willful
and knowing violation of any provision in chapter V of Title 47 before the civil
sanctions become applicable. Section 503(b)(1)(E), which incorporates section 1464 by
reference, is in chapter V and is thus covered by the section 501 requirement.
13 See text at note 77 supra. The future of the Justice Department's involve-
ment in the enforcement of section 1464 is uncertain. Commission Chairman Burch,
during the 1969 Hearings, supra note 71, intimated that the Justice Department had
promised to play a more active role in prosecuting offenses under section 1464. "I
think it is safe to say that the justice Department is not unwilling to take any one of
these cases if the FCC asks them to, and either prosecute the criminal or to enforce
any forfeiture that the FCC itself might impose. - Id. at 367-68.
" 4
 438 U.S. at 741.
15 Id. at 746-48.
" 6
 See, e.g., Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 697-98 (1974) (appellant, while
answering a question on cross-examination at his trial, referred to his alleged assailants
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tion does not require absolute protection, and that the nature of the forum
may determine the precise degree of protection afforded to the speech by the
first amendment."' The Court found that this protected speech can be regu-
lated in the broadcast arena according to principles analogous to the public
nuisance rationale under which the context determines the degree of afforded
protection.'" As in the case of public nuisances, the Pacifica Court sought to
channel the speech to a more appropriate context. The Court. reasoned that
the unique characteristics of broadcasting make it an unsuitable medium for
offensive language so as to warrant regulation of constitutionally protected
speech.'• The Court pointed to two unique characteristics of broadcasting
which justify the channelling of the offensive language: the intrusion of
broadcasting into the privacy of the home, and the radio's accessibility to
young children. 12 "
In the following analysis the appropriateness of utilizing these justifi-
cations for the regulation of constitutionally protected speech in the broadcast .
medium will be evaluated using the existing standards of review established by
the Supreme Court for the triggering of these rationales. It will he submitted
that neither of the factors cited by the Court justify this regulation. Next, the
article will compare the standard approved by the Court for the regulations of
protected indecent speech with the current standard for the regulation of
non-protected obscenity, and will assess the justification for the large dis-
crepancy between the two. It will be submitted that there is no valid explana-
tion for the fact that the standard for indecency is far less tolerant than the
standard for obscenity, and that the standard for regulating indecent speech
articulated in Pacifica should have been as limited as the standard for regulat-
ing obscenity articulated in Miller v. California. 12 '
In justifying the regulation of otherwise constitutionally protected speech,
the Pacifica Court pointed to the fact that radio broadcasts frequently con-
front listeners in their home where privacy interests are high.' 22 The use of
this privacy rationale in the present case, however, is.inappropriate. Although
an individual's privacy interest is entitled to great deference, it has been only
one of the elements to be considered in the existing standard of review for
the proscription of offensive speech; the invasion of the privacy interest must
also be intolerable. The Court in Cohen v. California 123 stated:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut
off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is ... depen-
as "chicken shit"); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973)
(appellant distributed a publication containing an article entitled "Mother-fucker Ac-
quitted"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (appellant wore a jacket
emblazoned with "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse).
1 " 438 U.S. at 746-47.
"fl Id. at 750.
IL" Id. at 748-51.
120 Id .
121 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
122 438 U.S. at 748.
121 Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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dent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being in-
vaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this
authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents
simply as a matter of personal predilections.'"
The Court has found that. an
 invasion of privacy is intolerable enough to
outweigh first amendment rights only when the offended individual is a
member of a captive audience, such as in the cases of roving sound trucks,' 25
or passengers on buses and streetcars.' 26
 The audience in those instances
cannot escape from the offensive material. The Court, however, has consist-
ently refused to ban speech where people who are exposed to offensive
material can simply "avert their eyes" or otherwise avoid the speech. 127
 If
one can avoid exposure, the Court reasons that the intrusion is not intoler-
able. Privacy interests are thus only sufficient to justify restrictions on speech
when the offended individuals are unable to avoid the offensive material.
In view of this established audience standard, it is surprising that
the Court in Pacifica chose to uphold the right of a citizen to insulate himself
at the cost of the rights of other persons to transmit and to receive the broad-
cast.' 28
 The offended radio listener can easily avoid prolonged exposure by
turning off the broadcast, and thus avoiding an intolerable invasion of his
privacy interests. It would appear as reasonable to request that unwilling recip-
ients of a broadcast turn off their radio or change the station after suffering
only momentary discomfort, as it does to assert, as the Court did in Cohen 129
and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,' that passers-by "avert their eyes" to
avoid seeing offensive material."' The use of the rationale of the intrusive
nature of broadcasting in this instance to justify a restriction of protected
124 Id. at 21.
125
 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ("In his home or on the street he is
practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loudspeakers except
through the protection of the municipality. - Id, at 87.).
126
 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 918 U.S. 298 (1974). See also Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
' 27 Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). ("In this regard, persons confronted with Cohen's
jacket were in a quite different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous emis-
sions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences. Those in the Los Angeles court-
house could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities by simply
averting their eves." Id. at 21.) See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
212 (1975) (invalidating an ordinance making it a public nuisance for drive-in movie
theatres to run films containing nudity on a screen which is visible from the street);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974).
128
 In fact, in earlier cases where the Court has authorized the regulation of
otherwise constitutionally protected speech, it has compared the regulated activity to
the innocuousness of a radio which can easily be turned off. "The radio can be turned
off, but not so the billboard or street car placard." Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105,
110 (1932). See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298. 302 (1974);
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
"" 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
' 11
 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975).
131 See note 127 supra. See also Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 26
(1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
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speech is thus contrary to precedent. Pacifica represents the first time that the
interests of possible offended recipients, who could easily elect to avoid the
material, have precluded protected speech from reaching potential willing re-
cipients.
The fact that the radio broadcast invaded a privacy interest in the home,
however, appears to have been accorded great weight by the Court. There is
language in the Pacifica decision to suggest that the Court was willing to grant
greater judicial respect to privacy interests in the home than to privacy in-
terests in the public domain.' 32 The Court thereby suggested that the degree
of the intrusion into the privacy of the home need not be as substantial as an
intrusion outside the home to warrant regulation. In this regard, the Court
relied upon its holding in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department 133 for
the proposition that intrusions into the privacy of the home will outweigh the
first amendment rights of any intruder. 134 However, this reliance on Rowan
is inappropriate. In Rowan, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute
which enabled a householder to require that mail advertisers remove his name
from mailing lists and that they stop sending him offensive material.' 35 In
effect, by enabling a person to avoid further offense from a certain source,
the Rowan statute merely gave the recipient the same opportunity, to cut off
any offensive material, already inherently enjoyed by the radio listener. Each
individual in Rowan was empowered to make his own determination about the
material and thus, unlike in the present case, the unoffended householder
was not precluded from receiving the material at the will of those offended
recipients. The evaluation of the offensiveness of the material was vested in
each individual, not in a government agency. Pacifica carries the privacy of
the home rationale beyond that which was envisioned by the Rowan Court by
allowing the government. to prohibit the protected but. regulated speech from
entering anyone's home."" The Pacifica Court has expanded a justification
for individual discretion into a justification for governmental censorship.
The Pacifica Court also used the fact of the accessibility of radio to chil-
dren to justify the restriction of the broadcast, citing Ginsberg v. New York"'
' 32 438 U.S. at 748-49 k n.27.
133 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
134 438 U.S. at 748.
133 397 U.S. 728, 738-40 (1970). Appellants challenged the constitutionality of
Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 39
U.S.C. § 4009 (Stipp. IV 1968). The section was extensively revised in 1970: it now
appears as Pub. L. No. 91-375, 39 U.S.C. §§ 3008-3011 (1976). •
1 " But see United States v. Treatman, 408 F. Stipp. 944, 953-54 (C.D. Cal.
1976), wherein the court refused to extend the holding of Rowan to uphold the consti-
tutionality of a statutory injunction prohibiting a defendant from mailing out offensive
material to addressees who had solicited the material or who had expressed no opinion
about receiving it. "The Supreme Court in Rowan struck a balance between the
mailer's right to communicate and the unreceptive addressee's right to privacy. The
balance was struck in favor of the addressee .... But there is no such balance to be
struck when considering the validity of an injunction against sending the advertise-
ment to people who have asked for it." Id. at 953. Similarly. the Pacifica regulation will
affect those who would be offended by the broadcast, those who wish to hear the
broadcast, and those who have no opinion about hearing it.
'" 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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and the governmental interest in safeguarding the well-being of youth.' 38
Under existing standards, however, the mere presence of children in the au-
dience is insufficient to justify the regulation. The Ginsberg Court adopted a
variable obscenity standard under which a statute could prohibit the sale of
material to minors which was otherwise constitutionally protected and was
concededly not obscene for adults.' 38
 In upholding the New York statute's
constitutionality, the Ginsberg Court found that it was permissible to control
more stringently the materials which are available to children than those
which are available to adults. In a situation where the statute denied access to
protected materials to both adults and children because the materials were
unsuitable for children, the Court found the regulation to be unconstitutional.
In Butler v. Michigan,"° the Court held that a prohibition on the sale of books
to the general public on the basis of their potentially adverse effect upon
minors violated the first amendment because it would "reduce the adult popu-
lation ... to reading only what is fit for children." 141
Pacifica is more analogous to Butler than it is to Ginsberg. In Pacifica, the
audience affected by the regulation is not a homogenous group of minors as
in Ginsberg, but rather, is a mixed group of adults and children as in Butler.
As the Pacifica Court acknowledged, the broadcast medium cannot segregate
its audience as can bookstores or movie theatres, and thus the offensive mate-
rial can only be withheld from minors by restricting the material at its
source.'" Although the cause of the problem in Butler was an overinclusive
state statute, whereas here it was the inherent nature of the broadcast
medium, the effect is the same. In both cases, the suitability of material for
children is determinative of its availability for adults. The Court in Butler tol-
erated the inevitable exposure of the unsuitable material to children in order
to avoid treading on the rights of the adult population; this ordering of
priorities should be applied to broadcast speech as well. It is submitted, there-
fore, that when the two audiences cannot be segregated, the mere presence of
children in the audience provides an inadequate basis for the curtailment of
basic constitutional rights of adults.'"
"" 438 U.S. at 749-50.
13"
 390 U.S. at 635-37. The statute which was challenged in Ginsberg prohibited
the sale of nude pictures of females to minors. Id. at 632.
"" 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
141 Id. at 383. The Buller Court found unconstitutional a section of the Michi-
gan Penal Code which made it a crime to sell to anyone a book containing language
which tended to corrupt the morals of youth. Id. at 381, 383-84. The Court found that
"[s]urely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig," Id. at 383.
142 438 U.S. at 749-50.
The Court also spoke of its obligation to uphold the right of parents to
make decisions regarding their children's welfare. Id. at 749. Although this obligation
has previously been cited by the Court, it has always been used to preserve indepen-
dence, not, as it is here, to curtail independence by substituting the government's
judgment about what children should or should not be exposed to. See, e.g., Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (upholding the rights of Amish parents to disre-
gard compulsory education laws by not sending their children to school beyond the
eighth grade); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (upholding the
rights of parents to disregard compulsory public school attendance laws by sending
their children to privately operated schools).
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Thus, under existing standards for the proscription of otherwise consti-
tutionally protected speech, the "unique" characteristics of broadcasting—its
intrusive nature and its accessibility to children—do not provide an adequate
basis for the present regulation. To deny access to information to all potential
listeners simply because the broadcast may reach children and unconsenting
adults in their homes is unsupported by judicial precedent. When children in
an audience cannot be segregated from adults, and when offended listeners
are not a captive audience, those adults who wish to exercise their con-
stitutional right to hear the broadcast should be accommodated.
An equally troubling aspect of this decision is that even if the characteris-
tics of the broadcast industry did justify imposing a higher standard of con-
duct on that industry, they still would provide no justification for the imposi-
tion of a harsher standard for protected indecent speech than that imposed
for unprotected obscene speech. Yet this decision affords less "protection" to
language which the Court conceded is protected than the leading obscenity
decision, Miller v. California," 4 provides to unprotected speech. In order to
constitute obscenity, the Miller standard demands that three elements be pres-
ent: (1) that the work taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest of the
average person applying contemporary community standards; 145 (2) that the
work depicts, in a patently offensive manner, sexual conduct as specifically
defined by the applicable state statute; '" and (3) that the work taken as a
whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'" In con-
trast, the Pacifica Court upheld the Commission's finding that the monologue
was indecent and hence prohibited by section 1464 merely because it described
"in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at
times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience."'"
Although the Court in Pacifica clearly distinguished indecency from
obscenity,'" a comparision of the two standards is both relevant and reveal-
ing. The current standard for what constitutes obscenity, as articulated in
Miller, is a product of almost twenty-five years of balancing possible injury
to people's sensibilities against the constitutional rights of others to hear
speech. 15° Because there are certain problems and principles common to all
regulations of first amendment rights, and because the theoretical evil gener-
ated by unregulated indecency is similar to the harm associated with unregu-
lated obscenity,'" it would seem wise to profit from the experience in this
' 44 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
145 Id. at 24.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 438 U.S. at 732 (quoting In re Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98).
149 See text at notes 49-56 supra.
' 50 The first modern obscenity decision was Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
See Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 104 (Commissioner Robinson, concurring).
15 ' Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly articulated the justification
for regulating obsenity, Professor Kalven has found five possible justifications: (1) the
incitement to anti-social conduct; (2) psychological excitement; (3) arousing feelings of
revulsion; (4) the promotion of improper sexual values; (5) the impact on character
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sensitive area in formulating a standard for indecent speech. The obscenity
standard is also pertinent to the present case because the Commisson, in its
Order, claimed to be revising its earlier indecency standard to conform with
the Court's reformulation of the definition of obscenity as articulated in
Miller.'" The Miller standard was thus used as the purported basis for the
present indecency standard.
It appears, however, that the current indecency standard disregards all of
the elements of the Miller standard, except that the proscribed language must
be offensive. The element of prurient appeal is, by judicial definition, absent
from the Court's formulation of the indecency standard.' 53 The indecency
standard also lacks the balancing concept, stressed in Miller, which weighs the
offensiveness of the material against its serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.'" Furthermore, Pacifica, while purporting to apply a com-
munity standard test similar to the one in Miller, ignores the emphasis in
Miller on an actual assessment of the local community's attitudes." 5 These
differences result in a much less tolerant standard for indecency than that
provided for obscenity.
The indecency standard used in Pacifica does not include an evaluation of
a broadcast's worth and thus eliminates any possible balancing test. When
children are in the audience, the use of offensive words cannot he redeemed
by claiming that they have social value.' 56 It is simply the presence of chil-
dren in the broadcast audience that vests the Commission with the power to
prohibit the offensive language. This stands in contrast to the obscenity stan-
dard which demands an evaluation of a work's value before it becomes cen-
sorable as obscenity. The Miller standard recognizes that not all patently of-
fensive depictions of sexual conduct are obscene since they can be redeemed
if' they have serious social value. It is thus an anomaly that the Pacifica Court
should find that every use of these offensive words, when children are in the
and, ultimately, on conduct. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sur.
CT. REV. 1, 3-4 & n.19. Similarly, the Commission claimed that indecency must be
regulated because it "has the effect of debasing and brutalizing human beings by re-
ducing them to their mere bodily functions ...." Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2c1 at 98.
"2
 56 F.C.C.2d at 94. The Commission's earlier indecency standard was set
forth in In re WUHY-FM, Eastern Educational Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). See
text and notes at notes 86-88 supra.
' 53 See text. at notes 49-56 supra.
" 4
 Interestingly, the Commission in Eastern applied a standard for indecency
which required that the material broadcasted be "(a) patently offensive by contempo-
rary community su/clank: and (b) utterly without redeeming social value." 24 F.C.C.2d
at. 412. The Commission found the broadcast. in Eastern to be indecent because it was
offensive and because the interviewee's remarks were purely gratuitous. Id. at 414.
The "utterly lacking" test was based on the then current obscenity standard enunciated
in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). which was overruled by Miller, re-
placing the "utterly lacking'' test with a int n e relaxed standard for the prosecutor of
"lacking- serious social value." 413 U.S. at 24. Although the Miller standard does nar-
row the protection affOrcled to the defendant by Memoirs, the Commission's purported
reformulation of its indecency standard in the light of Miller eliminated the value test.
entirely.
413 U.S. at 30-34.
' 3" r F.C.C.2d at 98.
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audience, constitutes indecency subject to regulation without regard for the
value of the material.
When there are fewer children in the audience, there are indications that
the Pacifica indecency standard might give way to an adult standard which
would include a consideration of the value of the material comparable to that
used in Miller. The Commisson in its Order said that when the number of
children in the audience is at a minimum, they "conceivably" might consider
whether the material can be redeemed by its value."' Similarly, the Court
left open this possibility by saying that the Pacifica holding did not extend to,
and that they were declining to rule on, circumstances where, due to the time
of the day or the content of the program, there would he less of a likelihood
that children would be present."'
It is difficult, however, to conceive of a fact pattern which would be more
appropriate than the one in this case to trigger this adult standard for inde-
cent speech. Both the time of day and the program content in Pacifica indi-
cated that there would have been very few children in the listening audience.
Statistics that were made available to the Court indicated that at the time of
the 2:00 p.m. WBAI broadcast there were fewer children in the listening audi-
ence than at any other time of the day, except for very late at night.'" The
157 Id. Commissioners Reid and Quello, however, indicated in their concurring
statements that they felt this language to be totally inappropriate for broadcast at any
time. Id. at 102 (Commissioner Reid. concurring); id. at 103 (Commissioner Quello,
concurring). Commissioner Quell() stated:
However, 1 depart from the majority in its view that, such words are less
offensive when children are at a minimum in the audience. Garbage is
garbage. Anti under no stretch of the imagination can I conceive of such
words being broadcast in the context. of serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. Under contemporary community standards anywhere in
this country, I believe such words are reprehensive no matter what the
broadcast hour.
Id.
Shortly after ihe Order was released, Ole Commission's General Counsel, address-
ing a group of licensees at a workshop entitled, "FCC Enforcement, -
 said that the
Carlin broadcast would have been punishable at 2:00 a.m. as well. Brief for Respon-
dent at 9 n.1 1, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (citing Broadcasting, April 14, 1975 at
40).
138 438 U.S. at 750.
''" Statistical Research, Inc., Radar Magazine 16 (Spring/Fall 1977) (cited in
Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al. at 9 n.7, Pacifica, 438 U.S.
726 (1978)). The statistics are summarized in the chart below:
AVERAGE-QUARTER-HOUR PERSONS 12-17 USING RADIO NATIONWIt)E*
Day-Part Monday-Friday Saturday Sunday
(000)	 % (000) (000)
6-10AM 4,243 17.8 2,978 12.5 2,339 9.8
IOAM-3PM 2,245 9.4 5,309 22.2 4.696 19.7
3-7PM 5,236 21.9 4,453 18.6 4,394 18.4
7PM-12M 4,178 17.5 3,811 16.0 3,440 14.4
12M-6AM 667 2.8 893 3.7 840 3.5
* 'Iota] number of persons 12-17 is 23,890,000. Data for children 2-II is not
compiled.
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implication, therefore, is that the broadcast might only be permissible when
played in the middle of the night. If indeed the Court intended this limit,
then the decision authorizes near complete censorship without regard for the
value of the program. With reference to the program content, the language at
issue in Pacifica was broadcast on a program whose erudite format and topic
selection would certainly not appeal to children.'" It is thus unclear when, if
ever, the number of children would be considered small enough to trigger an
adult standard which would include a balancing of the broadcast's value and
its offensiveness.
Moreover, even if a licensee did find a more appropriate time and man-
ner for a broadcast which contained offensive language, two problems with
adopting a Miller-type valuation of the broadcast would emerge. First, it
would be difficult to apply the Miller test of the value of a "work taken as a
whole." It is uncertain what the "whole" of the work would be for the purpose
of evaluating a broadcast: each day, each program, or the individual record?
Second, dicta used by Justice Stevens in his plurality opinion may have fore-
closed the possibility of any meaningful assessment of the worth of a broadcast.
justice Stevens placed these words on the lowest rung of the first amendment
hierarchy.'" His opinion characterized these words as "ordinarily lacking]
literary, political, or scientific value." 162 The benefits derived from their use
were declared to be outweighed by the societal interest in morality. 1i 3 Thus,
even if there were few enough children to trigger an adult standard, it is
unlikely that a lower court would ignore this dicta by finding that the value of
the broadcast outweighed its offensiveness. Therefore, although the valuation
of a broadcast may become an element in the indecency standard when there
is a decreased likelihood that children are present in the audience, it is un-
clear when there would be few enough children to trigger this valuation, and
whether the value judgments articulated as dicta in Pacifica. have precluded
the possibility of any meaningful balancing.
In addition to the differences associated with assessing the value of a
work, the indecency standard set forth in Pacifica and the obscenity standard
established by Miller significantly differ in their application of the community
standard test for determining the offensiveness of the material. In defining
indecency, the Commission articulated a community standard test similar to
the one in Miller.' However, the Pacifica Court, unlike the Miller Court, did
not require a realistic appraisal of the standards of the forum community.
Although the Commission found that the broadcast was offensive, there was
no mention of which community was used or what the community standard
was. It can be inferred that the Commission, sitting in Washington, D.C.,
without the aid of expert testimony, was applying only its views on indecency.
This action stands in contradiction to the Miller emphasis on realistic appraisals
of the contemporary community standard. After eleven years of contrary prece-
180 Sec text at notes 4-5 supra.
1 " 438 U.S. at 746-48.
162 Id. at 746.
I"9
	 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
164 Compare 56 F.C.C.2c1 at 99 with 413 U.S. at 24.
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dent, the Court in Miller abandoned its view that the jury must use a na-
tional standard in its evaluation of the offensiveness of allegedly obscene
material."5
 Although Miller does not require the use of a local community
standard, it emphasized that "offensiveness" is a question of fact for the jury
which should be decided in the light of the realities of the circumstances.'"
The Miller Court pointed out that there cannot be one national standard be-
cause people in different communities vary in their tastes and attitudes; the
standard used by the jury should reflect this diversity." 7
 In contrast, the
Pacifica Court was not concerned that the Commission, which assumes the
role of the jury, did not attempt to ascertain or apply the values of the actual
community within the broadcast range." 8
 The Court in Pacifica thus per-
petuated the very absolutism and imposed uniformity that the Court in
Miller attempted to correct.
Thus, it. is clear that the indecency standard, which contains neither a
question of prurient appeal, a valuation of the material, nor a reference to the
real standards of the forum community, is much more restrictive than the
obscenity standard which includes these elements. To be suppressible as
obscenity a work must have prurient appeal, lack social value, and be offen-
sive to the forum community. In contrast, to constitute prohibitable inde-
cency, a broadcast need only be found offensive by a board of commissioners.
The obvious justification for the more liberal obscenity standard would be
that obscenity involves complete government suppression, whereas indecency
theoretically only involves the relatively innocuous channeling of speech to a
more appropriate context. In effect, however, the Pacifica decision does au-
thorize the functional equivalent of complete censorship of these words for
adults with normal sleeping habits and for the many licensees who can only
broadcast during the daytime. For the reasons set forth in the foregoing dis-
cussion, it is uncertain when, if ever, there will be few enough children in the
audience so that the per se violation will give way to a more liberal adult stan-
dard.'"`' Given the facts of this case, the only time that the broadcast could
possibly be permissible is very late at night when most adults are not listening
to the radio and when many licensees are not broadcasting. This seemingly
innocuous channeling mechanism, therefore, does constitute censorship for
most, if' not all, potential listeners.
Once the channeling versus censorship distinction is pierced, the discrep-
ancies between the two standards become difficult to justify. Although incle-
'"5 413 U.S. at 31-34.
188 Id. at 32-34.
1F7 Id. The Court stated that, "Mt is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound
to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi ac-
cept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City."
at 32 (footnote omitted).
"8
 If the Commission did actually attempt to use a realistic standard, the ques-
tion of exactly what the station's local community would be remains. Would it be all of
the people within the radius of the broadcast, or would it only be the actual audience
of the station as determined by what particular group the station intended to serve
and to attract with its programming? See Note, Filthy Words, The FCC, and the First
Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 580, 636-40 (1975).
"" See text at notes 159-60 supra.
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cency is constitutionally protected, whereas obscenity is not, this false
dichotomy only obscures the more important similarities between the regula-
tion of obscenity and indecency: both result in censorship, both involve
balancing injury to people's sensibilities against the constitutional rights of
others, and both seek to avoid the same social harms. Thus, it seems illogical
that the regulation of indecency should not be subject to the same restraints
as the Court has imposed on obscenity regulation. It is submitted that the
Court's definition of indecency should have incorporated the same limitations
as were imposed on the definition of obscenity in Miller. The Court should
have considered the value of the monologue, and should have determined its
offensiveness by referring to the forum community's standard.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE PACIFICA DECISION
The Pacifica Court chose to confine its review to this particular
monologue as broadcast, and, as Justice Powell stated, to proceed slowly and
cautiously into this new area of the law of indecency.'" The Court, by nar-
rowing its focus to the specific setting, avoided the issue raised by Pacifica as
to whether the Court's construction of section 1464 encompassed so much
protected speech as to be unconstitutional.' 7 ' Unfortunately, as a conse-
quence of this judicial restraint, the decision leaves in its wake confusion, un-
predictability, and serious questions concerning the overbreadth of the stan-
dard and its constitutional limits. 172
The most disturbing aspect of the decision is that the Court failed to
provide any readily discernible limitations on the power of the commission to
censor broadcasters. The two demonstrably inadequate justifications 13 —
privacy and the presence of children—can be used by the Commission to
censor the airwaves of any protected speech it considers offensive without
regard for the value of the broadcast or for the true local community stan-
dard. Thus, the use of offensive words in the broadcast context could always
constitute a violation of the statute.'"
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the impact of the Order will be
minimized by the fact that it was issued in response to a particular complaint.
There is strong evidence in recent actions taken by the Commission to suggest
that they viewed the Order as a general pronouncement of policy. One week
after the Pacifica Order was issued, the Commission submitted to Congress its
1975 Report on Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material ' 75 in which the
Commission outlined its intention to fulfill its statutory obligation under sec-
tion 1464 by applying to all future violations the standard set forth in its
Pacifica Order.'" The Commission even affixed the Order to its report to
17" 438 U.S. at 755-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
1 " See text at notes 29-35 supra.
172 Id .
173 See text at notes 122-43 supra.
r74 Id.
173 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975).
17' Id. at 425. The Commission indicated a readiness to combat the incidence of
obscenity and indecency over the airwaves which generates no evil aside front offend-
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demonstrate how it intended to handle possible future violations of section
1464. The Commission's intent to apply this indecency standard generally was
also clearly demonstrated in Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania. 177 In this
case, the Commission focused on the broadcast of a live listener call-in show
which included, among other things, a conversation between a female listener
and the male announcer concerning the sex life of the caller's three-year-old
son.'" The Commission found that the broadcast was either obscene under
the Miller standard,' 79 or, alternatively, indecent by reason of the standard
established in the Pacifica Order."" Consequently, it imposed a Notice of
Apparent Liability and a $2000 forfeiture on the licensee in December of
1975.181 These two recent actions by the Commission can be read as estab-
lishing the Commission's policy on indecency, and strongly indicate that the
effect of the Pacifica Order will be of general applicability.
The view that the Court's decision was a judicial invitation for the Com-
mission to continue an activist regulatory role pursuant to section 1464 will be
held not only by the Commission, but by the broadcast. industry as well. The
Court's failure to trace the limits of the Commission's authority and of the
indecency standard realistically will have a chilling effect on the broadcaster's
freedom of expression, and, therefore, will lead to self-censorship of other-
wise protected speech. In an industry where they are dependent on the
Commission for their continued existence,'" licensees will undoubtedly avoid
broadcasting any material which could even remotely constitute indecent
speech. The Court recognized this potential problem but indicated that judi-
cial restraint was more important than protecting language which, the Court
thought, "lies at the periphery of First Amendment. concern."'" The Court
reasoned that the avoidance of any speech suspected of being prohibitable by
section 1464 "will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the con-
tent, of serious communication. There are a few, if any, thoughts that cannot
be expressed by the use of less offensive language. " 184
ing listener's sensibilities. Id. In the same report. however, the Commission adopted a
hands-off posture towards violent programing despite a Surgeon-General's report dem-
onstrating the harmful effect of televised violence on children. Id. at 420. "Regula-
tory action to limit violent and sexually-oriented programming which is neither obscene
nor indecent is less desirable than effective self-regulation, since government-imposed
limitations raise sensitive First Amendment problems." Id. These two positions seem
irreconcilable.
177 57 F.C.C.2d 782 (1975). Student-operated WPXN-FM in Philadelphia, Pa.,
broadcasted a live "free-form" music and listener call-in show called "The Vegetable
Report" on Monday nights from 4:00 to 7:00 p.m. Id. at 782. The Commission focused
specifically on the January 20, 1975 show. Id. It should be noted that the broadcast
was live and thus, there was no opportunity for editing. Id. at 782. To find this
broadcast to be a violation of section 1464, therefore, is a contradiction of the Com-
mission's earlier announcement that it would not apply the Pacifica standard to live
broadcasts. See note 111 supra.
I713 Id. at 782-88.
' 79 Id. at 790.
180 Id. at 791.
' 8 ' Id.
182 See text and note at note 78 supra.
'" 438 U.S. at 743.
184 Id. at 743 n.18.
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The Court's notion that ideas can be divorced from the words chosen to
communicate them does violence both to the Constitution and to judicial prece-
dent. As the Court in Cohen v. California correctly pointed out, the suppres-
sion of words carries with it a substantial risk of also suppressing ideas since
words serve both an emotive and cognitive communicative function.'" This
is well-illustrated by the facts in the present case wherein the emotive impact
of Carlin's satire on our linguistic conventions would have been lost without
his constant, almost nonsensical, repetition of the seven dirty words.
The magnitude of this intrusion into the heretofore insulated realm of
first amendment freedoms cannot be taken lightly. It substantially infringes
on the constitutional rights of broadcasters, recording artists, and listeners ' 86
to use the airwaves as an effective and diverse medium of communication.
Whether the Court will review the indecency standard more strictly as the
Commission chooses to exercise its jurisdiction more frequently remains to be
seen. It is suggested, however, that in future decisions in this area the Court
would do well to ponder seriously these words of Lord Devlin:
If freedom of the press ... [or freedom of speech] perishes, it will
not be by sudden death It will be a long time dying from a
debilitating disease caused by a series of erosive measures, each of
which, if examined singly, would have a good deal to be said for
it.'"
ANN-ELLEN MARCUS
18 ' 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). The Court in Cohen observed that,
[Llinguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys
not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but
otherwise inexpressible emotion as well. In fact, words are often chosen as
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the
view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of indi-
vidual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, prac-
tically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated.
Id.
188 The right to receive information and ideas is as protected by the first
amendment as the right to express them. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
187 The quoted language appeared in Judge Bazelon's dissenting opinion in
Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (motion for
rehearing—motion denied).
